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ARGUMENT
Point l
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS IN ITS BRIEF PRESENTED AN ARGUMENT
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A UECISION BY THIS COURT THAT THE LOWER
COURT DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT
THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION HAS PROPERLY TERMINATED.
Under this point respondent does not address the thrust of appellant's
issue on appeal, namely that appellant's conduct did not consititute such
a material breach of contract as would justify termination of the entire
contract assuming arguendo that the conduct in question constituted breaches
of the contract.

Accordingly respondent here did not contend that appellant's

conduct would constitute a material failure under Restatement of Contracts
(2nd) Sec. 241 or that such rule is not or should not be the law.

Instead

respondent asserts that the decision of the lower court is supportable if
the evidence justifies the trial court's determination that appellant's
conduct did not "foster the type of relations required under the contract
of December 23, 1982, to mutually benefit both parties" (P. 4).

This

assertion clearly focuses on the reason for this appeal, to-wit that the
court did not properly conclude that the main purpose of the contract of
December 23, 1982, was the delivery of social services to troubled youth
but rather that the contract was to assure a certain relationship between
the contracting parties.

This misunderstanding of the contract makes under-

standable the trial court's citation of appellant's refusal for reasons of
expense to relocate his office (Findings of Fact No. 4)

which would

certainly be a proper instruction for one in an employment relationship but
not one in an independent contractor relationship.

The same is true also

with

to the phone call which is the basis of Findings of Fact

No. 3.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT MISCONSTRUE THE EVIDENCE BY SHOWING THE
ACfC, WERE MINOR UI fJATURE AND DID NOT INVOLVE THE MAIN PURPOSE OF

THE CONTRAcr

(l)

Phone

January 10, 1983 (Find_i_Q_gs of

Whether or not in his deposition of March 8, 1983, Kent Burke
did not remember the phone call he made to Mr. Van Vleet after appellant's
call to the same genelemen or appellant's call to Mr. Van

the fact

remains that at least part of this transaction was not so important to him
that he recalled in just a few weeks later, a factor of importance in
determining whether it had such an adverse effect on the state agency as
to constitute a breach.
More important than the breach, however, if it was one, is
whether it went to the main purpose of the contract.

Clearly it did not

as it did not involve rendering social services to troubled youth.
(2)

Request of January 31, 1983, to move office (Findings of Fact No. 4)
Respondent's argument under this subpoint would be well taken if

the contract's main purpose involved the parties' relationship.

As noted

above, however, it did not and it was wholly irrelevant as to the social
services to be rendered by appellant as to where he maintained his office.

5)
A fair reading of the transcript on this point clearly shows that both
parties were seeking a legal means whereby respondent could pay appellant
Sl ,:,110 (011P-half ot the first $3,000 per month contemplated by the contract)
ctriJ

the rnanual was the: vf:hicle they used to justify that.
2

Appellant never

contended that he would not have to provide the hours of service that
sum represented less the 5 hours (not one hour as respondent contends see Finding of Fact No. 5)

This points up the core of this entire dispute -

the failure if not refusal of resµondent to assiqn social service tasks
sufficient for appellant to earn his $3,000 per month rather than wait until
June 30, 1983, to receive $18,000 for doing nothing, a situation appellant
objected to on behalf of the youth needing services as well as for his own
benefit.
(4)

Plaintiff-Appellant's meeting with Steve Trotter (Findings of
Fact No. 6)
Despite the conflict in the testimony between appellant and Burke

on behalf of respondent with respect to oral permission to make this contract
as pointed out in respondent's brief, the application of the well settled
presumption that evidence available to a party which is not produced will
be presumed to be adverse leads one to conclude here that this contract did
not produce any adverse effects since respondent did not produce any of the
five parties who might have supported its position on this point, namely the
two social workers, Roy Hussy and Matt Calpool, the foster parents, or the
boy himself.

Jn any event the court made no finding of any adverse effect

and could not have done so as there was no evidence to justify it or even
infer it.

At most it was a violation of protocol which did not go to a

material aspect of the contract.
With respect to the home parent training and counseling program
assigned on January 20, 1983, appellant did not address that in its brief
as the trial court did not make any findings with respect to it.

Appellant

respectfully submits to this court that the implication in respondent's
brief that the fact that this assignment was not completed prior to respondent's
3

termination of the contract is without any support in the record.

Within

such a short period it would be totally unreasonable to complete such a
project.
Respondent concludes under this point as follows:

"Each of

these goes to the very heart of the contract and the type of relationship
needed in a contract for professional services" underscoring added).

In

short respondent urges this Court to look to the relationship of the
contracting parties rather than to the contract itself in determining
whether certain conduct breaches an agreement.

Such a proposition seeks

a fundamental change in contract law totally unsupported by precedent or
principle.
Point 3
THE TERMINATION WAS NOT PROPERLY BASED ON REASONABLE
GROUNDS AND DONE IN GOOD FAITH AS REQUIRED UNDER A
TERMINATION "FOR CAUSE" PROVISION.
Except for the ipse dixit declaration that " . . . the acts of
Plaintiff-Appellant clearly meet the test of materiality as set forth in
the cases as well as the restatement section cited" respondent makes no
effort to argue materiality.

Certainly it sets forth no specifics and

cites no cases where similar acts only remotely connected with a professional
service contract breached it so materially as to warrant termination.
Respondent cites Restatement of Contracts (2nd) Sec. 283 which is
entitled "Agreement of Recission" as stating a distinction between termination
of contracts and cancellation of contracts.

This is not so but comment (a)

to that section points out that distinction in the course of distinguishing
both from an agreement of recission.
4

It is evident in the instant case,

however, that the respondent, the trial court, and the respondent's brief
itself ('.;Ece P. 5

) all based their : ilim to nullification of the

subject contract on the grounds of cancellation not termination within
the meaning of those terms as used in that comment.
Appellant takes no issue with the general proposition

that "grounds

for termination of a contract under express provisions therein are controlled
by such provisions, which ordinarily will be enforced according to their
terms" and the three texts in support thereof cited by respondent on P. 11
so state.

However, none of them lend any support to respondent's implication

that a right to terminate "for cause" gave either of these contracting
parties a right to terminate the contract for reasons which would not justify
termination for a material breach under the rules set forth in Restatement
of Contracts (2nd) Section 241.

If the contract were silent as to the grounds

for termination R 241 would require a material breach.

Is it not fair to say

that the specification of "good cause" was for the very purpose of incorporating a material breach standard so no one could contend on the one hand that
any breach however trivial would justify termination nor on the other hand
that the contract could not be ended during its term no matter how gross
the breaches might be.

In short appellant submits that the inclusion of

"good cause" gave him the protection of the materiality standard afortori.
Appellants' research failed to locate any Utah decision discussing
"good cause" in a contract.
With respect to Quick v. Southern Churchman Co., Inc., 199 SE 489
(Vin. 1938) the facts there speak for themselves in showing how very
5

opposite that case was fro111 the instant one.

The court's opinion as to

that states on r. 4Y';
[9] The evidence shows that the venture had failed. The
plaintiff and the defendant were each ad111ittedly insolvent,
certainly so far dS funds were required for the prosecution
of the venture. No donations or contracts for advertisements
had been received for several 111onths. It was costing more to
publish and circulate the paper than the defendant was realizing
therefro111. Quick had been advanced, from time to time, more
than $3,000. He had failed to pay the expenses of the promotion
campaign from his commissions. He had overdrawn a sum in excess
of the amount he was entitled to under the contract. Approximately
25% of the subscriptions were being cancelled for lack of payment
by the subscribers. Both parties were going further and further
into debt every month. All these facts and circumstances were
fully and fairly known to each of the111, and discussed by them.
The situation was that neither of them was able to fairly fulfill
the provisions of the contract, nor to realize their first expectations. A termination of the contract relation would manifestly avoid
further loss to each of them. There was nothing to indicate that
conditions would improve in the future. No advantage to either
could be gained by continuing the precarious situation. The entire
circumstances afforded good and just grounds for bringing the contract
to an end.
Nowhere is the testi111ony of the defendant's officers denied, or
contradicted. The evidence discloses that the notice of cancellation
was given in good faith. The facts therein contained, except as to
the amount of money originally claimed to be due from the plaintiff,
are admitted to be true. The erroneous amount claimed was corrected
upon a proper audit.
Quick did not disagree with the material facts contained in the
letter or notice of cancellation of August 2nd. He admitted that he
was unable to perform his part of the contract, and to keep his
representatives in the field, for lack of money. This latter
admission, with the consequences necessarily following therefrom,
if it did not actually constitute a legal breach of the contract
under the circu111stances, taken in connection with the other facts,
furnished an additional ground for termination of the contract.
As for R. J.

32 Cal. Rept. 545 (Cal. App. 1963)

the issue t11Pre with rP,pect to "yood cause" termination was solely whether
6

the existence of such a

1·•1L"1i,10n nonde;erl

arbitrary and absolute power to cancel it.
notes 14-16 on P. 559).

the contract invalid as an
It held that it did not (head

It certainly gives no support for the proposition

that acts not breaches of contract or breaches of contract which are not
material may constitute ''9ood grounds."
Even if this Court were to adopt the "for cause" termination rule as
advocated by respondent despite its vagueness and lack of acceptance,
appellant submits that the foregoing minor breaches of contract, if they
were breaches at all, do not establish the first of the two requirements,
aamely "reasonable grounds" (Respondent's brief P. 11).

As for the second

of the requirements, that is good faith the evidence is especially clear
as to the absence of that requirement.

This is clearly demonstrated by

'

respondent's answer admitting this allegation of the complaint (No. 3):
On February 4, 1983, Michael L. Hutchings advised
Plaintiff's attorney that Defendant was sending a letter
that date to Plaintiff advising him that the subject
contract was terminated for cause.
Four days thereafter on February 8, 1983, respondent's president wrote
appellant as follows:
I appreciate your eagerness to get going on your next
assignment; however we are in the process of putting together
our program and trying to determine which Y.C. workers will let
you counsel with them. I hope you will bear with us while we
determine where we can best use your talents. I expect to use
your talents on a weekly basis qiving you new assignments to
do as you complete old ones e<tc , so that you can earn up to
your contracted maximum amo1or1t cJlld even more on occasion each
month.
Then two days later without anything further transpiring appellant
received the formal letter of termination which is Exhibit D-32 in this case.

!L's true that the Court stated that respondent acted in good faith
lT 121 ,122) but no finding

of that fact was made in the Findings of Fact

(R 58-60) and in any event could not be supported on the basis of respondent's

own acts and admissions set forth above.
The letter of February 8, 1983, is also significant in showinq
respondent's awareness of appellant's basic complaint that he was not being
al lowed to earn the monthly income he expected because the respondent had
not given him a single assignment to work with troubled youth for whose
benefit respondent had contracted with the State to serve (Ex P-10) and
the subject contract was the means of providing such service.

Thus it

provides strong support for appellant's argument that this factor was
the basic cause of the difficulties between the parties.

That issue was

highlighted in the statement of facts in both briefs.
CONCLUSION
Respondent did not have any legal justification to terminate the contract
of December 23, 1982, on February 10, 1983, either on the basis of material
breach or on the basis of reasonable acts in good faith.

The judgment of the

lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of February, 1983.
Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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